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Fifth Amendment * Double Jeopardy in Capital Sentencing
Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981)
TN Bullington v. Missouri' the Supreme Court marked a significant departure
. from previous principles of double jeopardy. The Court, for the first
time, applied the Double Jeopardy clause to a criminal sentence. By pro-
hibiting the state from seeking the death penalty at retrial, the case also
casts important implications on capital punishment.
A jury convicted Bullington3 of capital murder' and, pursuant to the
state's death penalty statute,5 a presentence hearing to determine the sentence
was held before the same jury. Under Missouri law, a defendant convicted
of capital murder faces one of only two possible sentences: death or life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years.' The
death penalty can be imposed only if the prosecution proves beyond a
reasonable doubt at the presentence hearing that certain aggravating cir-
cumstances exist and that any mitigating circumstances found to exist are
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances." The jury is not compelled
to impose the death penalty,8 but if it does, it must designate in writing the
circumstances which justify the death penalty.'
At Bullington's presentence hearing, the prosecution submitted proof
of aggravating circumstances. The defense offered no evidence. The jury
considered the state's evidence but sentenced the defendant to life imprison-
ment.
After Bullington's motion for retrial was granted,"0 the state served
1 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
2 "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V.
3 Bullington was tried in the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in Jackson County, Missouri. The
decision was not reported.
4 Capital murder is defined in Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.001 (Vernon 1979). "Any person who
unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes the
killing of another human being is guilty of the offense of capital murder."
5 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.006-.016 (Vernon 1979). § 565.006.2 describes the presentence hearing
at which counsel make opening statements, testimony is taken, evidence is introduced, the
jury is instructed, and final arguments are made.
6Mo. STAT. ANN. § 565.008.1 (Vernon 1979).
7 Mo. STAT. ANN. § 565.012.1 (Vernon 1979). The aggravating circumstances are listed at
§ 565.012.2 and the mitigating circumstances are listed at § 565.012.3.
8A Missouri jury is instructed that, even if it finds sufficient aggravating circumstances
which are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, it need not impose the death penalty.
Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal (MAI-Cr) § 15.46 (1979).
9 Mo. STAT. ANN. § 565.012.4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
'
0 In granting his motion for a new trial, the trial court relied on Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357 (1979), which held that Missouri's statutory provision allowing women automatic
exemption from jury service violated a defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right
to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
[V/ol. 15:2
1
Keating: Bullington v. Missouri
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
notice that it would again seek the death penalty based on the same ag-
gravating circumstances considered at the first trial. The defense moved
to strike the notice on double jeopardy grounds and the trial court granted
the motion. The court of appeals denied the state's request for a writ of
prohibition, but the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the state's position
and vacated the trial order.'
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by Justice Black-
mun." The Court held that, under the Missouri bifurcated procedure for
capital cases, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment at his first trial
may not be subjected to the death penalty at retrial."3 The Court distinguished
earlier cases, "' which allowed increased sentences at retrial for the same
offense, because the Missouri sentencing procedure "is like a trial on the
issue of guilt or innocence" which "explicitly requires the jury to determine
whether the prosecution has 'proved its case.' "' Since the jury at the first
trial had "already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to
impose the death sentence,"' 6 the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
clause bars the state from retrying that issue.
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, argued that the Court was
simply ignoring the long established rule that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause
does not protect a guilty defendant's interest in avoiding a harsher sentence
upon retrial, even the death sentence.""' The dissent also argued that the
majority's extension of the "implicit acquittal" principle to sentencing was
unwarranted. Since the jury was instructed that it could refuse to impose
the death penalty even if the state proved the aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Powell stated that there was little "reason
to assume that the state failed to prove its case." 8
The leading case supporting the principle that the Double Jeopardy
clause does not prohibit the assessment of a greater punishment at retrial
for the same offense is Stroud v. United States." The Stroud decision was
based upon the fiction that the defendant waived any double jeopardy claims
11 Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980).
1 2 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice
Powell wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, and
Chief Justice Burger.
is 101 S. Ct. at 1862.
14 United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920).
15 101 S. Ct. at 1861. "It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined
by the Missouri statutes." Id. at 1858.
2cid. at 1861 (quoting Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d at 922 (Bardgett C.J., dissenting)).
27 Id. at 1865 (Powell, J., dissenting).
a8Id. at 1865 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
9 251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920),
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he might assert by appealing his conviction.' Although the Court distin-
guished between conviction and punishment, the opinion does not explicitly
address the question whether the Double Jeopardy clause bars an increased
sentence on retrial.2 1 As was pointed out in Patton v. North Carolina'
and reiterated in North Carolina v. Pearce,3 it is doubtful that the question
was ever presented to the Court. Despite these doubts, the Court has re-
fused to reexamine the Stroud rule.'4
As the Bullington Court recognized, the continuing validity of Stroud
rests on the distinction between the trial on the question of guilt or inno-
cence and the sentence imposed following a conviction. Where the de-
fendant is acquitted of the crime charged, it "is well established that the
Double Jeopardy clause forbids [his] retrial."' 5 But, the "imposition of a
particular sentence usually is not regarded as an 'acquittal' of any more
severe sentence that could have been imposed."'' 2 Thus, in the usual case
where a defendant is convicted again after having his original conviction
set aside the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar a greater punishment .2
This rationale has been attacked as violating the spirit if not the letter
of the Double Jeopardy clause."8 As Justice Douglas echoed in Pearce,
"[m]anifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being found a second
time guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second con-
20 "Mhe plaintiff in error himself invoked the action of the court which resulted in a
further trial. In such cases he is not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the
constitution." Id. at 18. The Stroud court based this conclusion on Trono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521 (1905). "Mhe reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole con-
troversy and acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been . . . . We do not
agree to the view that the accused has the right to limit his waiver as to jeopardy, when
he appeals from a judgment against him." Id. at 533.
21 Since the Court only discussed double jeopardy as it pertains to the protection from a
second trial, it appears that the defendant argued that he was twice placed in jeopardy
merely by being retried for first degree murder. The Court concluded that the defendant
had waived any double jeopardy claim since he sought the new trial himself. 251 U.S.
at 18.
22 381 F.2d 636, 644 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968).
23 395 U.S. 711, 732, (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 748 (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
24See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17 (1973).
25 101 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426, 433 (1980);
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 571 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1860.
28 People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1963). "Since
the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing
appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appeal." Id. at 497,
386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86. See also Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965); Whalen,
Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MiNN. L
REv, 239, 245 (1951).
(Vol. 15:2
3
Keating: Bullington v. Missouri
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
RECENT CASES
viction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution.""9
Given the conflict of these rationales, it is not surprising that Stroud has
not been consistently followed.
The major departure from the Stroud rule was announced in Green
v. United States."° In Green the defendant was tried under an indictment for
first degree murder. The trial judge instructed the jury on both first degree
murder and second degree murder, treating the latter as an offense included
within the former. Green was convicted of second degree murder, but had
his conviction set aside on appeal. Upon retrial, Green was again tried
for first degree murder. A new jury found him guilty of this charge and he
was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
original conviction for second degree murder operated as an "implicit ac-
quittal" of the charge of first degree murder." The Court noted that forcing
the defendant either to submit to an erroneous conviction or to take the
"desperate chance" of facing the death penalty should he successfully win
a retrial placed the defendant in an "incredible dilemma" which the law
would not tolerate.3
Although the Green Court distinguished Stroud,"' the tension between
the cases has not gone unnoticed." Certainly the defendant in Stroud took
no less of a chance in appealing his conviction. And, although these cases
can be distinguished on neat procedural grounds, as a practical matter, "the
imposition of an increased sentence on retrial has the same consequences
whether effected in the guise of an increase in the degree of offense or an
augmentation of punishment."35
The majority in North Carolina v. Pearce"0 did not see the matter in
this light, however. The Pearce Court reaffirmed the Stroud rule, but limited
its impact in two important ways. First, it held that the Double Jeopardy
clause requires that any punishment already served be fully credited at
the resentencing." Second, to guard against judicial vindictiveness against
29395 U.S. at 735 (quoting Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1837)).
- 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
3" Id. at 190-91.
8 2 Id. at 193.
331d. at 194 n.15.
, Justice Frankfurter, argued in Green that "it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case
in which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense from one in which he is convicted
of an offense that has the same name as that of which he was previously convicted
but carries a significantly different punishment." 355 U.S. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). See also People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963);
and cases cited at notes 21 and 22.
35 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 746-47 (Harlan, J., concurring in part).
S ld. at 720. The same day that North Carolina v. Pearce was announced, the Court in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) announced that the Double Jeopardy clause
applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
37 395 U.S. at 718.
Fall, .1981]
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a defendant who successfully appeals his conviction, the Due Process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires that whenever a judge imposes a
more severe sentence on retrial, his reasons for doing so must affirmatively
appear on the record.s
This due process protection proved to be limited. In Chajfni v. Stynch-
combe 9 the Court reasoned that the judicial vindictiveness feared in Pearce
would not be present where a jury imposed the sentence and thus refused
to extend the due process requirements of Pearce to jury sentencing." The
Court held that a jury may constitutionally impose a higher sentence upon
retrial "so long as the jury is not informed of the prior sentence and the
second sentence is not otherwise shown to be a product of vindictiveness."' 1
Thus, whatever their inconsistency, both Pearce and Chaffin reaffirmed
the Stroud rule against the Green decision. Although the Green rationale
was extended to another case,"2 it became clear after Pearce and Chaffin that
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy did not "of its own
weight [restrict] the imposition of an otherwise lawful single punishment
for the offense in question."4 3
But, not all punishments are the same. As the Court made clear in
Furman v. Georgia" and the many death penalty cases which followed,"
capital punishment is "qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long."' " Since the defendants in both Stroud and Chaffin
faced the death penalty on retrial, however, the "qualitative difference" of
capital punishment could not of itself tip the scale in favor of double
jeopardy protection.
Nonetheless, Furman and its progeny are important because of the pro-
cedural changes which they required. Although not ruling on the constitution-
38 Id. at 726.
39412 U.S. 17 (1973).
40 id. at 26-27. Justice Marshall, argued that "by establishing one rule for sentencing by
judges and another for sentencing by juries, the Court places an unnecessary burden
on the defendant's right to choose to be tried by a jury after a successful appeal." Id. at
43-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 ld. at 35.
42 See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
43 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
"5Some of the principal death penalty cases following Furman are: Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153(1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
4" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305.
(Vol. 15:2
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ality of capital punishment per se, 7 Furman and its companion cases,"8 held
that, as it was then being enforced by the states, the death penalty violated the
eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment. The separate
opinions in Furman made it clear that the overriding constitutional defect
in the states' death penalty statutes was the unbridled discretion of the
jury in imposing sentences. 9
After Furman, many states rushed to enact new death penalty statutes
in an attempt to overcome these constitutional infirmities. These statutes
were basically of two types. The majority of states provided for a mandatory
death penalty for certain crimes. The others provided for bifurcated trials
at which aggravating and mitigating circumstances could be considered
at the sentencing stage.59
In 1976 the Court decided five death penalty cases involving these
new death penalty statutes. In Gregg v. Georgia," Proffitt v. Florida2 and
Jurek v. Texas3 the Court upheld the respective states' death penalty statutes.
The plurality opinion"4 approved of the bifurcated procedure employed by
these states because it diminished the possibility of arbitrarily imposed
sentences. In the other two cases56 decided the same day, the Court struck
down mandatory death sentences as unconstitutional."
If there was any doubt following Gregg that the qualitative differences
between the death penalty and any other punishment required special pro-
T nJustices Brennan and Marshall thought capital punishment unconstitutional under all
circumstances, but Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White held it unconstitutional only in
the manner in which it was administered.
48 See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972);
Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972); and the numerous memorandum decisions
involving death sentences from other states all handed down the same day as Furman.
49 See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5 0 Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 N.D. LAwYER
261, 274 (1976).
81428 U.S. 153 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
52 428 U.S. 242 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
58 428 U.S. 262 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
a4 Justice Stewart, Powell, and Stevens formed the plurality for all three cases.
55 "In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman .. . are best met by a bifurcated pro-
ceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the
imposition of sentences and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."
428 U.S. at 195.56 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
STA mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional insofar as it fails "to allow the par-
ticularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted
defendant." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 303. In both Woodson and Roberts,
the Court noted that a mandatory death penalty, while usually unconstitutional because
it does not allow the sentencer to consider mitigating circumstances, may be constitutional
if restricted to the intentional killing by a prisoner serving a life sentence. Id. at 292-93 n.25;
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 334 n.9.
Fall, 198 1]
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cedural safeguards in capital cases, it was dispelled in Lockett v. Ohio."
The Lockett Court invalidated the Ohio death penalty statute because it
limited the number of mitigating circumstances which the capital defend-
ant was permitted to prove.59 This further refinement of the procedure under
which a capital defendant is sentenced was required, the Court said, be-
cause the death penalty is "so profoundly different from all other penalties
. . . that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.""0 The
upshot of Gregg and Lockett is that now every current nonmandatory death
penalty statute provides for some sort of bifurcated proceeding where the
sentencer can consider circumstances in mitigation or aggravation of the
crime."
The death penalty statute 2 considered by the court in Bullington
reflects this constitutionalization of capital punishment. Although the
Stroud line of cases had already answered the issue posed in Bullington,
the intervening developments on the constitutionality of the death penalty
required that the issue be confronted again.63 Thus, the decision in Bull-
ington v. Missouri does not rest on the fundamental uniqueness of the
death penalty." Rather, it rests on the uniqueness of the sentencing pro-
cedures which are constitutionally mandated in a capital case. 5
The decision in Bullington turns on this difference between Missouri's
capital sentencing statute and the sentencing practices employed in the
Stroud line of cases. The Court confined the Stroud cases to the usual sen-
tencing proceeding where "it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less
than the statutory maximum" confirms that the prosecution "has failed
to prove its case.""6 Under the normal proceeding, "there are virtually
no rules or tests or standards - and thus no issues to resolve."6 ' But in
Bullington, there were specific issues which the jury was required to resolve
before passing sentence." Since, in this case, the prosecution was required
59438 U.S. 586 (1978).
9 Id. at 604-05.
0 'Id. at 605.
61 Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 n.4. In an appendix to his article,
the author provides a very useful analysis of the death pnealty statutes of 35 states. Id. at
101-19.
62 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.006-.016 (Vernon 1979) (amended 1980).
e3 Ile defendants in Stroud, Pearce and Chaffin were not sentenced under a bifurcated pro-
cedure, not was the prosecution required in those cases to prove additional facts.
4 101 S. Ct. at 1864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65 "The history of sentencing practices is of little assistance to Missouri in this case, since
the sentencing procedures for capital cases instituted after the decision in Furman are
unique." Id. at 1859 n.15.
06 101 S. Ct. at 1860.
Id. at 1860-61 (citation omitted).
6s "The jury in this case was not given unbounded discretion to select an appropriate pun-ishment .. . . Rather . . . the jury was presented both a choice between two alternatives
and standards to guide the making of that choice." Id. at 1858.
[Voi.'15:2
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"to prove its case," the jury's verdict of life imprisonment operated as an
implicit acquittal of the death penalty."'
Actually, as the dissent suggested,"' there is a serious question whether
the application of the implicit acquittal principle was truly supported by
the facts of this case. Under Missouri procedure, the jury is not totally
without discretion - it can reject the state's evidence of aggravating cir-
cumstances, even if these are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and in-
stead impose a sentence of life."1 For whatever reason, the court does not
address this question.
Notwithstanding the flaws of the majority opinion, the dissenting opin-
ion is also suspect. The dissent's refusal to acknowledge that the sentencing
changes mandated by Furman could have any effect on the rational of
Stroud gives undue weight to cases decided under now archaic procedures.
Although it is true that Bullington's "ordeal upon retrial would not be
different in kind from that of the defendants in Chaffin and Stroud,""2 it is
no less true that the "evolving standards of decency"7 have vitiated the
procedure under which the defendants in Stroud and Chaffin were sentenced.
The dissent would ignore this difference and mechanically apply stare
decisis. Thus, both opinions in Bullington appear to be logically defective.
Each conveniently fails to account for pertinent facts to reach the desired
result. Nevertheless, the majority opinion is preferable on policy grounds."'
In fact, one can argue that the court should have gone further and
overruled Stroud. As previously stated, 5 the rule which Stroud has come to
represent was never argued before the Court. Additionally, there are com-
pelling reasons for applying the Double Jeopardy clause to criminal sen-
tences.7 ' Besides the double jeopardy arguments, Stroud can be attacked
on other grounds. For example, it has been held that the imposition of an
increased sentence at a new trial for the same offense violates the basic policies
69 1d. at 1862.
TOId. at 1865 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
7 See note 7 and accompanying text.
72 101 S. Ct. at 1864-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73 The Court's analysis of the death penalty in Gregg suggests that the procedures under which
capital defendants are sentenced must periodically be re-evaluated against "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 428 U.S. at 173
(citation omitted).
74 See State v. Wolfe, 46 N.J. 301, 309, 216 A.2d 586, 590 (1966) where the court said:
Awareness of that principle [that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty
except by a trial free from prejudicial error] stimulates judicial reluctance to see the
price of an appeal from an erroneous conviction set at the risk of a man's life. Such
a price, in our judgment, is a hardship so acute and so shocking that our public policy
cannot tolerate it. Consequently, we hold that since the State has granted the universal
right of appeal, standards of procedural fairness forbid limiting the right by requiring
the defendant to barter with his life for the opportunity of exercising it.
75 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
7e See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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of criminal justice by imposing an unjust burden on the defendant's right
to appeal a conviction." Finally, the inconsistencies between Stroud and
Green and between Pearce and Chaffin expose the arbitrary nature of the
Stroud rule.
The Court, however, chose not to overrule Stroud. Despite its incon-
sistencies, Stroud has flourished and is now an established principle of law.
Earlier this term, in United States v. DiFrancesco,8 the Court reaffirmed
Stroud. One could hope, but hardly expect, that Stroud would be abandoned
at this late stage. Thus, Bullington and Stroud both must be seen as vital
principles of double jeopardy law. Under the usual sentencing procedure,
Stroud will apply and the successful criminal appellant must face the possi-
bility of an increased sentence at retrial. Under a bifurcated procedure,
however, the rule announced in Bullington will have to be considered.
If the defendant did not face the death penalty at the first trial, then
it is doubtful that Bullington will prevent the assessment of an increased
sentence at the new trial. DiFrancesco, decided before Bullington, involved
a bifurcated procedure too, yet the Court held that the defendant had not
been twice placed in jeopardy when the government appealed his sentence.
The issue in DiFrancesco involved the validity of section 1001 (a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,"" which authorized the imposition
of an increased sentence upon a dangerous special offender and grants
the government the right to take that sentence to the court of appeals for
review.8" There are important differences between DiFranceso and Bullington
though. DiFrancesco involved appellate review, "not a de novo proceeding
that gives the government the opportunity to convince a second factfinder
of its view of the facts."'" More importantly, the bifurcated procedures were
different in the two cases. In DiFrancesco, the sentencer was given much
discretion"2 and although the prosecution was required to prove the addi-
tional fact that the defendant was a dangerous special offender, its burden
of proof was only a preponderance of the evidence. In contrast, the jury
at Bullington's first trial had much less discretion and the prosecution was
required to prove the existence of additional facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. Assuming the continued validity of DiFrancesco,8 the rule an-
nounced in Bullington will not apply in all cases where the defendant is
sentenced under a bifurcated proceeding. Specifically, it will not apply in
??People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); State v.
Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966).
78 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980).
79 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
8 Id.
82 101 S. CL at 1859.
921d.
83We must assume that DiFrancesco is still valid, given the length to which the court wentin distinguishing that case from Bullington, 101 S. Ct. at 1858-59.
(Vol. 15:2
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a non-capital case where the jury is given broad discretion at the sentencing
phase and the prosecution's standard of proof at the pre-sentence hearing
is less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
These considerations highlight the importance of Bullington for de-
fendants charged with capital crimes. As was mentioned above, all the
states which have a nonmandatory death penalty provide for a bifurcated
proceeding where the sentencer can consider additional evidence before
assessing the punishment." Twenty-eight of these states currently provide
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence
of aggravating circumstances before the accused can be sentenced to death."5
It follows that in these states, if a defendant is not sentenced to die at his
first trial, the decision in Bullington necessarily prohibits the prosecution
from seeking the death penalty at any retrial for the same offense. Addi-
tionally, it should make no difference whether the sentencer is the judge
or the jury.8" Thus, it is unlikely that the decision in Bullington will spawn
a dichotomy similar to that in Pearce and Chaffin with different rules of
double jeopardy being followed where the identity of the sentencer is not
the same. Furthermore, the fact that many of these states do not require
the sentencer to impose the death penalty even though the prosecution has
"proved its case" appears to be of little importance in the application of
the Bullington principle since the jury at Bullington's first trial had this
discretion also.
In those states where the prosecution's burden of proof is less than
the reasonable doubt standard,87 Bullington raises two distinct questions.
The first question is whether Bullington will be extended to protect the
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment under this lesser standard from
facing the death penalty at retrial. The decision in Bullington placed con-
siderable weight on the fact that the prosecution had to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed the decision implicitly seems to require
this higher standard before double jeopardy protection is available to the
capital defendant in a Bullington situation.8 Under the better view, though,
if a state imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution and the prose-
cution fails to secure the death penalty at the first trial, then the prosecution
should be prevented from seeking the death penalty at any retrial. For
" See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
85 Id.
" See Gillers, supra note 61, at 101-19 for a compilation of how each state determines who
the sentencer will be in a particular case.
87 Id.
8The majority framed the issue in Bullington as "whether the reasoning of Stroud is also
to apply under a- system where a jury's sentencing decision is made at a bifurcated proceed-
ing's second stage at which the prosecution has the burden of proving certain elements
beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed." 101 S. Ct. at 1854(emphasis added). Furthermore, as was mentioned at supra notes 82 and 83 and accom-
panying text, the Court relied at least partly on this greater standard of proof in distinguishing
Bulllngton from DiFrancesco. 101 S. Ct. at 1859.
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if the prosecution is barred from seeking the higher punishment in those
states where its burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, then it
surely should be prevented from twice seeking the death penalty where
its burden of proof is less.
The second problem that Bullington raises is whether a state may im-
pose the death penalty at all where the prosecution's burden of proof is
less than the reasonable doubt standard. It is a fundamental principle of
criminal law that the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.9 Although the prosecution is ordinarily not required
to prove that the defendant should receive a particular sentence, the Su-
preme Court has required that the prosecution prove the existence of aggra-
vating circumstances in addition to proving the defendant's guilt before
the defendant can be sentenced to death.9" The decision in Bullington, by
applying the Double Jeopardy clause - another fundamental principle of
criminal law - to cases where the defendant faces the possibility of capital
punishment, appears to implicitly require the prosecutor to prove the ex-
istence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before
the death pealty can be imposed." For insofar as the sentincing stage of a
bifurcated procedure "is like a trial on the question of guilt or innocence,"92
the prosecution should be required to "prove its case" beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In conclusion, although the decision in Bullington was based on the
procedural aspects of a capital trial and not on the fundamental uniqueness
of capital punishment, its impact on the death penalty, as a practical mat-
ter, is just as important. By holding that, under the Missouri bifurcated sys-
tem for capital murder, a defendant who is sentenced to life imprisonment
may not be subjected to the death penalty at retrial for the same offense, the
decision further defines the "qualitative difference" between death and
other punishments. And by its novel use of the Double Jeopardy clause,
the Supreme Court accords finality to the judgment that a capital defendant
shall not die.
PATRICK J. KEATING
69 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
'
0 See notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
91 Cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 605 [t]he qualitative difference between death and other
penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death penalty is imposed).
92 101 S. Ct. at 1861.
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